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Abstract 
This paper examines the basis of what constitutes a system/s and discusses the commonalities 
in relation to critical infrastructure system. It focuses on identifying, and discussing system 
characteristics, complexity, inter-relationships, dynamics and the importance of modelling as 
applied to critical infrastructure systems. It then considers four differing system-modelling 
styles with the view to assess and discuss their potential to model critical infrastructure 
systems, ahead of selecting the most promising and suitable for adoption to critical 
infrastructure system modelling. 
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Introduction 
The properties of critical infrastructure systems display the characteristics of highly 
structured, complex and interconnected networks that also have the added issues of 
dependency and interdependency relationships, which by necessity exist between 
infrastructure systems to facilitate the supply of services. This is particularly prevalent when 
considering the energy sector, where the continuity of the supply of electricity for example, is 
crucial to many other sectors of critical infrastructure and their systems, for the ongoing 
provision of services to the community at large (Scott, 2005). 
 
Critical infrastructure systems are vulnerable and can be damaged, destroyed or disrupted by 
breakdowns, negligence, natural disasters, accidents, cyber incidents, illegal criminal activity, 
malicious damage or as the target of both conventional and information warfare to name a 
few. For these reasons and others, the continuity of supply requires protection against such 
hazards, threats, vulnerabilities and risks. Therefore the aim of government policy and, by 
association, that of infrastructure owners and operators, is to ensure continued supply 
availability through identifying and implementing improved protective safeguards and 
security analysis in response to the risks and threats posed (Scott, 2005). 
 
The premise of this research is that as part of the wider security analysis process of critical 
infrastructure systems that part of this process should encourage the analyst to model such 
systems as a means to determine and identify system vulnerabilities. It is possible that such 
initial modelling of the system from a number of scalable levels within the infrastructure will 
not only enable the modelling of normal operations, but also enable the modelling of 
prognosticative outcomes resulting from deviations to normal function, whether they are 
internally or externally sourced influences or a combination thereof.  
 
 This paper begins with focusing on establishing the characteristics of what a system is 
essentially and discusses systems thinking and dynamics before proceeding to identify the 
characteristics of critical infrastructure systems. The next aspect focuses on the rationale 
behind the modelling of such systems and the issues surrounding the modelling of critical 
infrastructure systems, together with identifying the functional and relational dynamics at play 
both internally and externally to the system/s in general. Finally, a brief assessment of the 
potential value offered by various security system modelling and simulation development 
products will determine which modelling style is potentially adaptable to modelling critical 
infrastructure systems for further research.  
 
What is a System? 
What constitutes a system evokes different meanings, perceptions and conceptual 
visualisations to different individuals depending on their interpretation of the focal structure. 
This construct is generally derived from its functional characteristics, physical structure, its 
response behaviours and incorporates its inferred complexity of components that interact 
together to form a single functional system representation. Yet systems exist in numerous 
forms from the biological, ecological, social, to the mechanical and through to natural systems 
such as the solar system for example. In simple terms, systems exist to perform routine 
functions and are comprised of sub-systems, for instance a job can consist of a number of sub-
systems relating particularly to human, economic, technical, legal and social systems that can 
act individually, be influential upon or interact with each other (Maani & Cavana, 2000).  
 
In seeking an understanding of what commonalities are indicative of a system, it can be 
generally characterised that a system is a collection of smaller parts that cooperate with one 
another to function as a whole. However, a system is not only just the sum of its parts, but it is 
also a representation of its surrounding interactions, behaviours, influences and relationships 
with other systems, whereby a system can associate its own parts to itself and become a 
contributing part of an even larger system (Maani & Cavana, 2000). 
 
The presence of some or all of these features will indicate the presence of a system, but to be 
able to develop a deeper understanding requires further investigation and analysis of the 
system itself. Therefore, to appreciate the complexity of how the internal sub-systems and 
their parts all interact and function collectively as a whole, requires the analyst to apply the 
paradigm of ‘systems’ thinking’ to develop an ability to comprehend the system as a whole, 
consisting of many parts, and its position within the wider system environment.  
 
Systems’ Thinking 
Systems’ thinking is a discipline dedicated to understanding the complexity that is intrinsic 
within all systems, irrespective of their size, nature, composition or influence exhibited upon 
the system. This is regardless of whether the system is located internally to a system or 
externally by association with other systems. As a paradigm, systems’ thinking is about 
describing the dynamics of relationships between the lessor parts within system and by 
extension the dynamics of relationships with other associated or neighbouring systems.  
 
Therefore, systems’ thinking requires the investigator or analyst to look at the dynamics of the 
system by considering it from the following three perspectives (Maani & Cavana, 2000): 
 
 • Dynamic thinking is appreciating that the world is not static and that things are 
changing constantly; 
• Operational thinking is the cognitive condition of understanding the physics of 
operations and how things really work; 
• Closed-loop thinking is recognising that cause and effect are not always linear and that 
the end (effect) can influence the means (cause). 
 
This is not as easy as it may first appear when considering the implications of larger systems 
interacting with other large systems and that each in themselves contain numerous sub-
systems all interacting within the boundaries of their own system. Additionally, this 
complexity exacerbates further when considering the influential relationships that can 
potentially exist between large systems as well as within the sub-systems making up these 
larger systems too. All this information is at best difficult for humans to comprehend and 
process in relatively small and simple systems, let alone when contemplating large, complex, 
multiple systems and their functional behaviour.  
 
To address this issue the application of systems modelling techniques delivers an ability to 
represent the system from an overview perspective that enables scalable modelling of the 
system’s components and its internal structures through to the greater external system 
environment in which the system resides and functions.  
 
Systems Modelling 
To analyse and comprehend the magnitude, functional behaviour, influence and physical 
structure of any system, at any level of scale, it is beneficial to our ultimate comprehension to 
model it. Modelling enables the analyst to depict and scope the system of interest in such a 
fashion as to enable the analyst to gain a high-level and expansive view of the system. By 
modelling the system, we can develop an appreciation of the structure of the system itself and 
the interconnection between its internal elements or components. In addition, modelling also 
delivers potentially powerful insights into the relational influences of neighbouring or 
associated systems that can affect the system and how localised change can affect the whole 
system including the resources that the system provides to or utilises from other systems. In 
achieving a model reflective of a system understanding and functionality as such, then it 
should enable model manipulation to an extent where it becomes possible to predict and 
measure possible system behaviour in response to the manipulation based on attempts to 
imitate the precursor influences that lead to eventual system change (Maani & Cavana, 2000). 
 
In considering the modelling of the system from this perspective as such, is essentially 
modelling a system that exhibits change and thereby the influence of ‘cause and effect’. This 
requires applied system thinking in relation to and consideration of, modelling the dynamic 
characteristics inherent within the system or external to the system, where a cause (system 
influence) has a potentially different effect each time on the means of how the system 
responds, changes or reacts. Hence, in this context, the overriding characteristic is that the 
system is not behaviourally constant in necessarily reproducing the same repeatable result or 
outcome, but dynamic in the sense that the result can be infinitely variable and therefore 
modelled with this consideration in mind. 
 
Similarly, critical infrastructure systems also exhibit the aforementioned dynamic behaviour 
and characteristics of multiple variables that can potentially coerce differing outcomes and 
system responses. Therefore, the modelling of such systems requires that particular 
 consideration to the type of modelling method employed, must by necessity, represent the 
dynamics characterised by the system. Such modelling methods must be capable of precise 
application to represent authentically a theoretical account that is truly representative of the 
dynamic characteristics inherent in the physical critical infrastructure system at that time and 
its subsequent behavioural responses. 
 
Modelling Systems Dynamics 
While modelling gives us the ‘big picture’ representation of the system, the modelling of 
systems that exhibit dynamic behaviour requires the careful consideration of a number of 
issues. For instance, a dynamic system is adaptable and its parts are interrelated in such a 
manner that a change in part of the system, by consequence affects other parts of the system 
and therefore the overall system and its performance. Furthermore, not only can the system be 
functionality influenced by internal changes, it is also susceptible to influence from external 
changes in environmental factors surrounding the system or from other existing systems, via 
feedback.  
 
Feedback and System Dynamics 
This premise of system dynamics reflects the description provided by the System Dynamics 
Society (2006) that describes the term ‘system dynamics’ as a method of studying and 
modelling complex response systems that are apparent in any sort of feedback-equipped 
system. Feedback is the situation where via a chain of ‘cause and effect’, A influences B, 
which in-turn influences A and therefore the study of the link A and B cannot be undertaken 
independently, as it is the link between A and B that predicts how the system will behave. 
With this in mind, only the study of the whole system as a feedback system will lead to the 
appropriate systematic conclusions for modelling purposes. 
 
Therefore, to construct a useful interpretation or model of a dynamic system as described 
requires an analysis of the system to develop a useful understanding of the system situation 
through elaboration, exploitation and interpretation of a simulation model, which is heavily 
reliant on the mental interpretation of the developer. Here a useful interpretation refers to a 
given understanding of the system situation at a given moment together with the perceived 
mental structure of the whole system (Schaffernicht, 2006).  
 
It is the interpretation of these system characteristics and modelling issues that when applied 
to critical infrastructure systems reflect the similarities of system constructs, components and 
dynamic behavioural characteristics of critical infrastructure systems.  
 
Critical Infrastructure System Characteristics 
According to Australia’s national strategy, critical infrastructure is defined as “those physical 
facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if 
destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly 
impact upon the social or economic well-being of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to 
conduct national defence and ensure national security” (AGD, 2004a, p1). 
 
Moreover, by its very structure critical infrastructure systems are interconnected and 
networked together as necessary for the supply and demand of services to and from each other 
 and consumers in varying degrees. It is this structural inter-relationship between critical 
infrastructure systems and the internal components within them, which characterises critical 
infrastructure as a dynamic system made up of smaller independent or reliant systems. 
Therefore, critical infrastructure systems can be further characterised, as dynamic systems 
because they are highly reliant on each other, susceptible to influence and interrelated by 
necessity to function together in a cooperative and dynamic manner so that the system can 
remain adaptable to function and supply the services as normally expected (Pye & Warren, 
2006b).  
 
Another intrinsic characteristic of critical infrastructure systems is the ‘unboundedness’ of the 
component systems that are interrelated or networked together to form a larger functioning 
system. This is characterised by the distributed nature of local system administrative control 
that exists without any central governing authority. An unbounded environment cannot be 
partitioned into a number of finite bounded environments because of the lack of global 
perspective given to the associated cooperating systems beyond the boundary of their local 
system, consequently there is a lack of the ‘big picture’ information represented locally, in 
regard to feedback from the system as a whole (Ellison et al, 1999).  
 
From this we can draw the inference that indeed crtical infrastructure sytems do display 
similar characteristics to that of dynamic systems because they consist of multiple variables 
with dynamically changing values, dependency relationships existing between and within 
interelated infrastructure systems and they exhibit network connection charateristics that are 
subject to both internal or externl change and influences. This necessitates that in the national 
interest critical infrastructure systems do need to be modelled as part of the overall security 
analysis process to assess, identify and determine points of weakness or areas of vulnerability.  
 
The modelling of critical infrastructure systems offers an alternative and possibly cost 
effective and timely way to manage the security analysis process by reducing the task to a 
manageable size. Particularly, when considering the sheer size and magnitude of these 
systems, modelling presents a means of collating data and undertaking security system 
analysis to derive security solutions, test and further analyse the refined models prior to 
implementation into the physical critical infrastructure system. 
 
Why Critical Infrastructure Modelling is Important  
From a systems dynamics perspective there is strong logic that offers potential improvements 
in the analysis, security, functional understanding and strategic management perspectives of 
critical infrastructure systems, along with insights into understanding variations in system 
performance (Warren, 2005). Since performance is an indicator of the state of resources or 
service provision, strategies can be developed and tested through system modelling to 
enhance policy development and review physical implementation prior to taking security 
decisions that physically address performance variation and deviations from normal 
functionality in the face of unexpected challenges.  
 
Therefore, by further extending modelling in this manner it is quite feasible to develop 
adverse scenarios that could be applied to critical infrastructure system models, thereby 
representing security threats and vulnerabilities that can impinge upon the system. This would 
enable analysts to predict the resultant system response/s and its potential affect on the 
following (AGD, 2004b): 
 
 • Business continuity;  
• Incident and consequence management;  
• Information system attacks and vulnerabilities;  
• Electronic crime;  
• Protection of key sites from attack or sabotage;  
• Chemical, biological and radiological threats to water and food supplies; 
• Accident management;  
• Cyber incidents. 
 
These are just a few possible scenarios that will possibly be developed for testing on models 
of critical infrastructure systems once the modelling method that is deem appropriate has been 
chosen for the focus of ongoing research. Thus enabling the potential scalable modelling of 
critical infrastructure systems such as (DPMC, 2004): 
 
• Communication networks;  
• Banking;  
• Energy;  
• Water and food supplies;  
• Health services;  
• Emergency services; 
• Transport networks.  
 
Fundamentally, this provides the opportunity to model adverse situations as applied to the 
critical infrastructure systems, without necessarily testing this same adverse scenario situation 
in the physical realm of the infrastructure itself. 
 
This will inevitably assist those confronted with undertaking and exercising control over the 
security of critical infrastructures systems to better manage and cope with unexpected 
decisions. Jensen and Brehmer (2003) describe these as ‘dynamic decision issues’ that 
characterise a series of related decisions where invariably the system/s situation will change 
both in itself and in the response to the actions taken. Therefore, the modelling and analysis of 
the security dynamics at play within the system not only enables observation of the normal 
functionality, but also the functionality of an adverse change and its effect upon the critical 
infrastructure system. Thus to a degree removing the element of surprise, for without this 
prior knowledge owners and operators of critical infrastructure systems will remain severely 
handicapped and ill prepared for whatever may potentially eventuate (Warren, 2005). 
 
Modelling Critical Infrastructure Systems 
The effective modelling of critical infrastructure systems would enable both the government 
and critical infrastructure owners, operators and customers to analyse, identify and effectively 
manage and maintain the security, stability and availability of their particular critical 
infrastructure through the development of solutions and contingencies against unexpected 
challenges to the system’s stability (Pye & Warren, 2006a). 
 
To this end, the authors briefly examine four different modelling methods and their potential 
to address the primary issues of effectively representing the modelling of critical 
infrastructure systems, to represent the existing physical properties of the infrastructure 
system within the modelling scope. Also with a view of incorporating its dependency 
 relationships to other associated infrastructures, within the boundaries set by the model 
developer and whether such modelling techniques as applied, justifiably represent the 
dynamics of the system being modelled and if it is applicable, adaptable or transferable to 
critical infrastructure modelling. 
 
The EASEL Way  
EASEL (Emergent Algorithm Simulation Environment and Language) is a beta version 
software program designed for the ‘simulating, depicting, and gathering information about 
networks, software agents, and other active entities of the physical, electronic and software 
worlds, about their interactions, and about their collective global effects’ (Fisher, 1999, p1) of 
the real-world systems upon which the EASEL simulation is modelled.  
 
EASEL is a script language that utilises property-based types to define the various entities 
(actors) that can be created by the language and its strength lays in its capability to depict and 
model, unbounded systems to simulate the complex interactions that take place between the 
various types of entities within the system (Redman et al, 2005). The software package 
remains freely available online for download from the Software Engineering Institute at 
Carnegie Mellon, but current support and development of the EASEL software itself seems to 
have lapsed (SEI, 2006). 
 
Redman’s (2003) research into system survivability noted that the use of EASEL as a 
simulation development tool had some performance limitations that impinged upon the design 
and development of this network survivability, simulation research project. Principally the 
software was only available for the Apple Macintosh operating system platform and because 
the software was still in the ‘beta’ development, there was a lack of resources to support the 
developer or instructions to aid simulation production using the EASEL software. Therefore, 
the simulation development was a time consuming process due to ‘trial and error’ 
development method employed, the lack of support and the taxing resource load imposed by 
EASEL on the operating system, this made testing and running of the simulations difficult 
due to the resource demand and program instability. Likewise, Marasea’s (2003) research 
utilised EASEL to develop a simulation model representing an attack upon a critical 
infrastructure system, here again Marasea (2003) noted similar design, development, support 
and operational issues that impinged upon this research project too. 
 
EASEL is not particularly conducive to rapid model development or systems analysis of 
dynamic and unbounded systems modelled utilising the EASEL environment. This is due 
largely to the long development lead-time necessary to develop a functional simulation, the 
essentially non-existent user support for EASEL development and the issue of heavy 
computer resource use. Even in the review of these previously functioning simulations, there 
still a major issue that more often than not led to the computer devoting 100% resources to 
running the EASEL software, to the extent that the simulation program cannot load and run 
therefore making analysis of the simulation impractical. 
 
EASEL presents one alternative to the question of modelling critical infrastructure systems 
however, the time consuming model development process and the lack of ongoing 
development of the EASEL software package itself, has now ceased (SEI, 2006). This 
indicates that there is a need to model critical infrastructure systems quickly so that important 
analysis of the system can be undertaken to identify normal operation, vulnerabilities and the 
effect of adverse incidents upon normal system functionality. 
 Stock and Flow Diagrams  
A form a dynamic system modelling that is growing in popularity within business 
particularly, is the Stock and Flow diagram whose notation consists of three of three different 
types of elements, namely, stocks, flows and information. The three elements together in a 
diagram graphically represent any dynamic process that may be apparent in any business and 
therefore can be utilised to represent the characteristics of such processes and illustrates the 
relationship among variables that have the potential to change over time (Kirkwood, 2005). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates an example of a very simple stock and flow diagram with the three 
elements Casual Staff, sales and Permanent Staff and models the structure of the business 
process concerning the rate at which Casual Staff numbers reduce to zero, as the numbers of 
Permanent Staff required, is dictated by the flow of sales.  
 
Casual 
Staff 
sales
Permanent 
Staff 
 
Figure 1: Stock and Flow Diagram. 
 
The two different types of variables illustrated inside the rectangles are variables called a 
stock, level or accumulation. The variable sales is shown next to the ‘butterfly valve’ or ‘bow 
tie’ symbol and this type of variable is known as a flow or rate, thus the two lines through the 
butterfly valve looks like a pipe with the valve controlling the flow. The premise of Figure 1 
is that this represents the flow of Casual Staff towards Permanent Staff with the rate of flow 
controlled by the sales valve; this is the key idea behind the difference between stock and 
flow. Therefore, a stock represents an accumulation of something and a flow is the movement 
of something from one stock to another (Kirkwood, 2005). 
 
The final element of the Figure 1 diagram is the information link represented as a curved 
arrow and this notation represents that the value of Casual Staff influencing the value of sales. 
Additionally, and of equal importance is the lack of an information arrow from Permanent 
Staff to sales, which illustrates that information regarding the value of Permanent Staff has no 
influence over the value of sales (Kirkwood, 2005).  
 
Hence, the purpose of the stock and flow diagram is to depict the process changes and how 
the elements and the structure of the process interact together to bring about change. This 
form of modelling focuses on the elements that make up the process (sometimes likened to 
the components of the system) and how the performance of the process changes over time and 
forms the basis of studying the dynamics of a simple process using stock and flow diagrams.  
 
The underlaying weakness of stock and flow diagrams is that they can only deliver a 
simplistic representation within a defined process boundary of a simple process. 
Unfortunately, from the perspective of modelling critical infrastructure systems stock and 
flow diagrams are not readily applicable to this type of system modelling due to the size and 
complexity of the systems. The other important issue is the scalability potential of stock and 
flow diagrams in regard to these systems as they tend to become difficult to interpret due to 
 the diagrams added complexity in depicting the logical interconnection, processes and 
dependency relationships of critical infrastructure systems. It appears that stock and flow 
diagrams are better suited to modelling less complex system processes with clearly defined 
boundaries and is not necessarily well suited to modelling multiple interconnected and large 
complex critical infrastructure systems from a security analysis perspective. 
 
Viable Systems Modelling  
The Viable System Model (VSM) represents a framework for managing the security of large 
multi-level organisational information systems as a means of detecting, checking and 
identifying threats and vulnerabilities as they appear. VSM utilises local sub-system 
monitoring that can distinguish between threatening and non-threatening behaviours and 
adjusts the whole system as a consequence (Hutchinson & Warren, 2002).  
 
From the research perspective of Hutchinson and Warren (2002), VSM provides a framework 
to manage the security and normal function of organisational information systems that are 
cooperating as a larger overall information system, to deliver ongoing system security that 
takes into consideration all levels within the greater system. 
 
The disruption or destruction of information systems can cause serious loss of service to 
customers and increasingly information systems are under threat from both internal and 
external sources and there is a need to establish a robust and dynamic response to protect 
information assets (Gokhale & Banks, 2004). In view of the structure of critical 
infrastructures and their reliance upon information systems, there is obviously a need to 
establish ways to protect such systems and VSM may offer benefits for this perspective.  
 
However, from the aspect of modelling the activity of a critical infrastructure system with a 
view to analysing the critical infrastructure system as a whole, its internal system components 
and the dependency relationships between critical infrastructure systems, VSM may not be 
applicable due to the sheer scope, size and diversity of function. Therefore, while it may be 
applicable at the organisational level, the magnitude and scale necessary for modelling critical 
infrastructure systems across the state or national level would be well beyond VSM’s 
capabilities and difficult for an analyst to implement and manage with any ongoing 
effectiveness at this scale. VSM remains useful as a framework for organisations, but is 
simply not adaptable to critical infrastructure system modelling.  
 
Coloured Petri Nets 
Jensen (1998) indicates that CPN’s as a modelling language, is theoretically well founded and 
adaptable for application to systems of the size and complexity that characterise typical 
industrial projects, which is not unlike the characteristics inherent in critical infrastructure 
systems. Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) offer a systematic method of modelling highly 
interconnected, cooperating networked systems in a scalable manner that depicts diverse 
function and their logical interconnection based on the physical representation of the critical 
infrastructure systems modelled.  
 
Furthermore, the CPN model enables an analysis of the physical and operational structure of 
the critical infrastructure system to be analytically scrutinised by means of simulations and 
state spaces that incorporate time. Thus lending the use of CPN’s to performance evaluation 
 to evaluate how fast the system functions. Additionally, it is a relatively simple task to 
develop a computer simulation representation of the critical infrastructure system from the 
initial model. Therefore, a CPN model can potentially represent the normal functionality of 
the system and the normal functional relationships between cooperating critical infrastructure 
systems. From this perspective, the CPN notation would represent the following within the 
model (Jensen, 1998): 
 
• Place - represents a particular infrastructure; 
• Transition – is the exchange of services between cooperating infrastructures; 
• Token – has a value, but must exist at the input place to enable the transition to fire; 
• Arcs – represent the connections between infrastructures. 
 
When a critical infrastructure system model is developed that satisfactorily reflects normal 
functionality, it seems a relatively easy and quick task to redevelop another CPN model to 
indicate, incorporate and represent a potential threat to the system to deduce a possible system 
response observation. Thus, the central focus of this system modelling research is to predict 
and map the potential security impact upon the critical infrastructure system/s modelled and 
the associated critical infrastructures via their dependency relationships. From this viewpoint, 
it is possible to identify the probable outcomes of threats and vulnerabilities and potential 
solution scenarios responses. In this way, it enables the testing of proposed security solutions 
within the modelling environment on the system, before potentially progressing towards 
actual implementation in the physical critical infrastructure system itself. 
 
CPN modelling offers an interesting approach to modelling critical infrastructure systems that 
requires deeper investigation, as it takes into consideration the dynamic nature of the systems 
involved, the dependency relationships that exist between cooperating infrastructure systems 
as well as mapping service delivery or failure within the critical infrastructure system model 
too. 
 
Modelling Assessment Overview 
Of the four modelling styles discussed, they all address the modelling issues in some part 
from their own specialised perspective and are all potentially beneficial and capable for the 
analysis of system security issues relating to critical infrastructure systems, however there is 
no single perfect solution. What is required is to choose the modelling method that is 
adaptable and potentially delivers the ‘best fit’ modelling capability to enable the effective 
modelling of critical infrastructure systems. It must take into consideration, system scalability 
and scope, interdependency relationships, incorporate systems dynamics, and enable rapid 
model development for security scenario testing, analysis and security solution development. 
 
While, EASEL was specifically designed to model unbounded and dynamic systems it was 
found that the simulation software was unstable and computer processor greedy, operating 
system specific (Apple only), still in the software development stage although this has now 
ceased, along with negligible user support. Indeed the overriding issue was the extended 
design and development lead-time needed to develop a model simulation that means the 
timeframe required to develop and model security solutions quickly makes EASEL 
impractical for this task.  
 
 Stock and flow diagrams are currently very popular within the field of modelling dynamic 
systems and processes in business and they lend themselves to rapid model development. 
Unfortunately, from a critical infrastructure modelling aspect, stock and flow diagrams are not 
very scalable as the diagrams do become unsuitably complex to be of any real value when 
dealing with the relationships between multiple processes within a system or representing 
external system influences. While there is a need to understand the modelling notation used, it 
does not necessarily translate well to the non-professional perspective concerning an 
appreciation of the system being modelled. Additionally, the modelling methodology itself 
seems more appropriate to modelling smaller, less complex and isolated processes that 
represent system dynamics. 
 
VSM represents system modelling from the information security management perspective of 
an organisation, which by it very nature requires close and trusting cooperation between the 
infrastructures exchanging services and VSM displays a highly level of complexity that 
impacts upon the security management coordination required. Unfortunately, the VSM 
security management framework is not a modelling tool applicable to modelling the systems 
for security analysis from the critical infrastructure system perspective, although it would 
have a part to play in the management of security within the organisation supporting the 
critical infrastructure owners and operators. 
 
Finally, CPN’s offer a potential modelling instrument that is network centric, scalable, which 
resembles the logical structure and physical representation of  critical infrastructure systems 
and is very quick and easily to develop. It also has the added benefit that enables the building 
of a computer-generated simulation based directly off the initial model, depending on what 
modelling package used. Much of CPN modelling research literature currently relates to 
process modelling because CPN modelling enables rapid model development and computer 
simulation development in very short timeframes. This feature would greatly assist in 
developing and testing security solutions that are also easy to manipulate and change if 
modelled utilising CPN’s. 
 
Conclusion 
This research has led to identifying the system characteristics and properties inherent in 
critical infrastructure systems and investigated the issues incumbent in modelling systems 
generally, and those of critical infrastructure systems. Several commonalties regarding system 
analysis, systems thinking, and system modelling are also consistent and applicable to critical 
infrastructure systems from a systems modelling development perspective.  
 
Additionally, the importance of modelling critical infrastructure systems provides a process 
whereby normal functionality of a particular critical infrastructure or associated dependent 
critical infrastructure systems offers opportunities for the identification of threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks. Furthermore, this also presents the opportunity to model potential 
security solutions for analysis and assessment prior to the physical implementation.  
 
This investigation also represents an initial comparison of modelling methods that have been 
previously applied to analysis and simulation of unbounded networks (Easel), organisational 
security (VSM), system dynamics modelling (Stock and Flow Diagrams) and network 
analysis (CPN) and their potential application to modelling critical infrastructure systems.  
 
 As critical infrastructure systems were found to be highly networked, complex, and dynamic 
in nature and subject to the influence of dependency relationships, it appears that CPN’s offer 
the best possibilities for addressing the modelling of critical infrastructure systems for 
security analysis purposes. Although, further stepwise research will continue to more deeply 
assess the capability of applying CPN’s to the task of the effective modelling and computer 
simulation development of physical critical infrastructure systems. This research now forms 
the foundation for the next step in the ongoing research investigation into the application of 
CPN’s to modelling scaleable of critical infrastructure systems and their associated internal 
and external system network connections and relationships. 
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